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We make use of metrics to identify what we call ‘the most resilient exit
nodes of the Tor network’, and so gain an insight into their characteristics.
This first quantitative answer, we hope, will be of help, both to the users
and makers of this network.
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1 Introduction
Some questions are like some flowers, so perennials : ‘present at all seasons
of the year ’.
—
“Can I install extensions for the Tor Browser?”, “What ISP should I
use if I want to run a relay or exit node?”, etc.
But to answer these, words should never be left long without numbers,
and common language, with its inherent incertitudes, avoided as much as
possible – hence we chose to opt for a different approach than has been
generally so far, to answer one of them.
The quantitative approach adopted here will be a complement to the
more qualitative methodologies preferred so far1.
2 Methodology
Resilience here is understood as a combination of age and present status
(i.e. the node must be running).
Our criteria in this study were :
– The relay is an exit node;
– The exit node has existed for at least 1000 days;2
– The exit node is running.
We make use of the Tor Metrics database3, where this translates into
the following search query :
flag:exit running:true first_seen_days:1000-10000
With about 180 servers as a result, at the time of writing4.
To describe them going forward we use consistently the nomenclature
‘most resilient ’.
—
This approach, of course, merits comment, but it is the best ‘proxy’
(in the sense that this term has within statistics) that this problematic
has for answer; an approximation in other words.
It does not account for instance for the fact that some of the most
resilient Tor exits may have happened to be down, or offline, at the time
of this writing, or that some of those recorded here may have been inactive
for considerable periods of time. We do not account for this (though the
aforementioned database provides this information for the latter).
1https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/doc/GoodBadISPs
2An arbitrary value, as one must be chosen, resulting in a number of servers small enough
to be handled by one researcher.
3https://metrics.torproject.org/
4The number fluctuated between 177 at the beginning, 180 in the middle, and 178 again
by the end of our research (single day). We can only conclude this was attributable to the
smaller nodes, hence we added a criteria of our own : bandwidth should be 1 MiB/s or more.
The servers that were left did not change, we went through the list multiple times.
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—
Because computer science is a social science – as computer scientists
eventually always find out – it must deal with the same problems that
these same sciences have been dealing with for centuries.
Except, they may find themselves not well equipped enough, lacking
the right tools to solve these problems, having either rejected or ignored
them.
—
This research gives an overview of the most resilient exits of the Tor
network, and their ISP’s (Internet Service Providers).
3 Results
We truncate the values for total bandwidth.
ISP Number of exit nodes amongst ‘most resilient’ Total bandwidth
OVH 10 155 MiB/s
Leaseweb 3 118 MiB/s
NForce 3 89 MiB/s
Online 6 53 MiB/s
Bahnhof 1 38 MiB/s
Flokinet 6 22 MiB/s
Table 1: Most resilient exit nodes of the Tor network and commercial ISP’s.
ISP / org. Number of exit nodes amongst ‘most resilient’ Total bandwidth
Zwiebelfreunde E.V. 12 490 MiB/s
Calyx Institute 13 163 MiB/s
Tetaneutral.net 2 107 MiB/s
DFRI 5 105 MiB/s
Table 2: Most resilient Tor exit nodes and non-commercial ISP’s, organizations.
Tetaneutral.net, an ISP built as an association, provides services for
the non-profit organization Nos oignons.
Finally, it is our understanding that Zwiebelfreunde, an association, is
behind the exit nodes with nomenclature nifty.
4 Recommendations
From a prescriptive point of view, this does not mean users wishing to
start a Tor relay or node – exit or otherwise – should necessarily choose
3
one of the companies which, in this research, come up often (e.g. OVH,
Leaseweb or Online).
As the association Nos oignons – two of the largest ‘most resilient’ exit
nodes – point out the Tor network suffers from what they call a problem
of “diversity”, understood in the following specific sense :
(...) a big majority of Tor relays are hosted at OVH, Online
and Hetzner, three leaders in cheap, mainstream hosting.
With the algorithm currently used by Tor to determine routes
or circuits between relays, it would unfortunately be enough
to compromise these three companies to gain a considerable
overview of the network, and make it easy to launch attacks
on users with the goal of de-anonymization.
By choosing other ISP’s, we contribute to improve the Tor net-
work’s quality : the more relays are hosted with other providers,
the harder it gets to conduct a global surveillance of the net-
work, the better its security.5
Less obvious commercial ISP’s unveiled in this study include NForce,
which provides more bandwidth to ‘most resilient’ exit nodes than Online,
Flokinet, which services no less than 6 such relays, and Bahnhof, whose




To the owners of the most resilient Tor exit nodes – who, with their pages
they have given us much to laugh, and with their courage much to think,
dream.
To the universities and their staff : the University of Waterloo, Boston
University, the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, and Carnegie
Mellon University.









... – we apologize to those we could not identify and hence forgot.
—–
We will not mention those who in fact are not among them, as they have
identified themselves, but the reader is left to draw their own conclusions
as to the merit of the ones that aren’t here : be they their own universities,




--- ca. 70 MiB/s
 
PrivacyRepublic0001    OVH SAS
ExitNinja    Leaseweb Deutschland GmbH
marylou2    Tetaneutral.net
niftymouse    Joshua Peter McQuistan
niftyquokka     Joshua Peter McQuistan
niftysugarglider    Joshua Peter McQuistan
niftychipmunk    Joshua Peter McQuistan
 
--- ca. 50 MiB/s
 
marylou1    Tetaneutral.net
apx1    NForce Entertainment B.V.
CalyxInstitute15    The Calyx Institute
niftypika    Joshua Peter McQuistan
niftyjerboa    Joshua Peter McQuistan
CalyxInstitute10    The Calyx Institute
niftypedetes    Joshua Peter McQuistan
gurgle    University of Waterloo
che    Bahnhof AB
tollana    BENESTRA, s.r.o.
dreamatorium    Unithost Internet B.V.
kree    BENESTRA, s.r.o.
ori    BENESTRA, s.r.o.
hviv104    SURFnet bv
niftyvolcanorabbit    Joshua Peter McQuistan
niftygerbil    Joshua Peter McQuistan
niftyhedgehog    Joshua Peter McQuistan
apx3    NForce Entertainment B.V.
 
--- ca. 30 MiB/s
 
Unnamed    Leaseweb USA, Inc.
ogopogo    Hextet Systems
niftycottontail    Joshua Peter McQuistan
DFRI5    Foreningen for digitala fri- och rattigheter
DFRI0    Foreningen for digitala fri- och rattigheter
Libero    Specialized Bulletin Board Systems
DFRI3    Foreningen for digitala fri- och rattigheter
prawksi    Hextet Systems
niftyguineapig    Joshua Peter McQuistan
manipogo    Hextet Systems
Dhalgren    Leaseweb Deutschland GmbH
dexter    Magyar Telekom plc.
QuintexAirVPN1    Quintex Alliance Consulting
 
--- ca. 20 MiB/s
 
jumpnet    TOCICI LLC
DigiGesTor1e1    SOFTplus Entwicklungen GmbH
rehm    IP-Only Networks AB
DigiGesTor1e2    SOFTplus Entwicklungen GmbH
Unnamed    Online S.a.s.
Unnamed    Online S.a.s.
DFRI1    Foreningen for digitala fri- och rattigheter
DFRI4    Foreningen for digitala fri- och rattigheter
birnenpfeffimitzimt    D-hosting die Rackspace & Connectivity GmbH
eddy    NForce Entertainment B.V.
xmission1    XMission, L.C.
AlGrothendieck    Association Gitoyen
argenla    Online S.a.s.
chaucer    Hextet Systems
snowfall    Hextet Systems
cowcat    Hextet Systems
PrivacyRepublic0002    OVH SAS
TorThdNinja    OVH SAS
multisec2    Broadnet AS
tor03k    OVH SAS
lewwerDuarUesSlaav    ServerAstra Kft.
kramse2    Zencurity ApS
Apollo    Denetron LLC
kramse    Zencurity ApS
multisec5    Broadnet AS
multisec4    Broadnet AS
Wix    OVH SAS
 
--- ca. 10 MiB/s
 
PrivacyRepublic0003    OVH SAS
batrelay    Andreas Fink trading as Fink Telecom Services
multisec3    Broadnet AS
PrivacyRepublic0004    OVH SAS
Cloud    OVH SAS
FelixIO    Keyweb AG






marcuse2    Ielo-liazo Services SAS
marcuse1    Ielo-liazo Services SAS
CalyxInstitute09
AquaRayTerminus    Aqua Ray SAS
CalyxInstitute14
Minotaur    GoDaddy.com, LLC
CalyxInstitute03
hedden    Quasi Networks LTD.
CalyxInstitute01
TorExitVIF    Concorde inc.
CalyxInstitute04
ua321    UA VPS LLC
micole    PT Cloud Hosting Indonesia
torNodeCom2    Login, Inc.
BostonUCompSci    Boston University
windeck    23media GmbH
saveyourprivacyex1    Flokinet Ltd
glittershy    MCI Communications Services, Inc. d/b/a Verizon Business
corewars    MULTACOM CORPORATION
torNodeCom    Login, Inc.
Mercury    Denetron LLC
nacor    CityNet Telekom Ltd.
ibibUNC0    University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill
Unnamed    Hurricane Electric LLC
Unnamed    I.C.S. Trabia-Network S.R.L.
yuicat2    CYBERDYNE
 
--- ca. 5 MiB/s
 
timcinel    OVH SAS
Unnamed    I.C.S. Trabia-Network S.R.L.
ByteIndian    Online S.a.s.
ByteIndian1    Online S.a.s.
alkalal    SC Fastweb SRL
balthaasar    Online S.a.s.
Unnamed    I.C.S. Trabia-Network S.R.L.
Digitalcourage3ip1    Martin Prager trading as NbIServ
cragg    RADIOGRAFICA COSTARRICENSE
TorExitRomania    Flokinet Ltd
PESEC    JSC ER-Telecom Holding
drogo    Makonix SIA
Unnamed    Inter Connects Inc
Unnamed    Flokinet Ltd
TorExitFinland    Flokinet Ltd
LebLibraries    Comcast Cable Communications, LLC
BoingBoing    Priority Colo Inc
PulseboxExit    OVH SAS
ekumen    GANDI SAS
cmutornode    Carnegie Mellon University
initramfs    Data Communication Business Group
tauro    DataCorpore Servi\u00E7os e Representa\u00E7\u00F5es
nibbana    Flokinet Ltd
HelpCensoredOnes    Visual Online S.A.
ThorExit    OVH SAS
Unnamed    Data Communication Business Group
LetoAms    Xs4all Internet BV
vcexit1    Flokinet Ltd
servicenode01    Get AS
Gertrude    Linode, LLC
zoombaroomba    Hostkey B.v.
anduinExit01    Broadnet AS
notamateurhour    AxcelX Technologies LLC
barwin    Data Miners S.A. ( Racknation.cr )
toreffiorg    European Backbone Networks Inc.
RunningOnFumes1    Hydra Communications Ltd
CrashMe    EWE-Tel GmbH
Thoreau    CenturyLink Communications, LLC
HorstHanfblatt    Contabo GmbH
 
--- ca. 1 MiB/s
 
